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## BOOK REVIEWS.

THE RELIGION OF ALL GOOD MEN, AND OTHER STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By H. W. Garrod, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. London: Archibald Constable and Company, Ltd., 1906. Pp. xi, 229.

The title of this book is distinctly attractive, and the book itself is decidedly interesting. There is learning in it, and undoubted ability behind it. Written from a frankly naturalistic standpoint, it is singularly free from bitterness and narrowness. The opening essay is a lengthy one on "Christ, the Forerunner," in which the author maintains that Christ never applied the title "Son of Man" to himself. Mr. Garrod fears that "many" will think his interpretations "strained," and in this he is certainly right. As his frequently forced and artificial interpretations touch matters theological, rather than ethical, there is no call to examine them in this place. A word may be said, however, as to his treatment and equipment. He assumes, for one thing, that the designation "Son of Man" always carried to the people of Christ's day "a Messianic significance," which is to ignore the weight of scholarship opposed to the notion of such current use of the title; and, for another thing, Mr. Garrod assumes that "Christ uses the title Son of Man as a synonym for Messias" (p. 24)—by it "always meant the Messiah" (p. 25)—which, in the same fashion, ignores the increasing disfavor with which the best Biblical scholarship of the day regards such a view. A more generic term than that of Messiah, only in the end—in veiled or indirect form—did it carry Messianic claim with it. But Mr. Garrod does not discuss, much less dispose of, rival views. As to his general contention that Christ never applied the title "Son of Man" to himself, one may be pardoned for stating a question that suggests itself. Nowhere could "good sense" receive a greater apotheosis than in Mr. Garrod's book, and how then did Mr. Garrod's "good sense" not keep him from expending his abilities and time on the fatuities and futilities of this long chapter? There are four scholarly appendices to the chapter, but Mr. Garrod's theological reading needs widening, and there are too many subjective impressions, conjectures, probabilities, and mild dogmatisms. Mr. Garrod rarely glows, but once in a while he gives out something good, as *e. g.*, when he says of the personality

of Jesus (p. 69), "He so left behind him all that was alien and hampering that he saw all things with the 'single eye,' the whole of him was 'full of light.' Onenesss of purpose and freedom of spirit were his shield and buckler."

But there are more directly ethical matters in the book. The chapter entitled, "Christian, Greek, or Goth," is one of the best in the book, even though one may have points of clear disagreement with the author. Mr. Garrod stands for more justice to "Gothic morality" and its distinctive ideals. Christian ethical ideals Mr. Garrod almost always presents in some painfully crude traditional form, which one is quite well accustomed to, but it is surely a bit hard on Greek moral ideals that Mr. Garrod says, "Aristotle may have been a coxcomb, but he was not a gentleman"—"resembles a gentleman in a novel of Disraeli, but no other kind of gentleman." Whatever may be said of its truth, the humor of this sort of writing is distinctly enjoyable. After vindicating, in his own way, the ideals of chivalry and honor, Mr. Garrod closes the chapter with one of his best and most suggestive passages on duty as an ideal. Not much moved by Kant's famous apostrophe, our author says, "To be moral is to identify the whole of ourselves with the whole of good. So long as we think of 'duty,' we make, a false and base distinction between ourselves and the good." "The men who won the battle of Trafalgar were the men who did more than their duty. So long as we do only our duty, we are not only unprofitable, but ineffective, servants." Thus it is that, "escaping Christianity," Mr. Garrod would have us also flee the Greek ideal, and never "conduct in a kind of moral conservatory a flirtation with Hellenism which can come to nothing."

From this chapter we pass to a long one on "The Religion of All Good Men"—a most inviting theme. But, when we come to our author's treatment of the subject, what can be said? This only, that the religion of *all* good men becomes the religion of *one* good man, and that good man Mr. Garrod himself. "Each man must find his religion for himself, since otherwise it can never be to him a religion." "He who is worthy of some religion better than that in which he has been brought up, will, as years go on, find it for himself." And if, when he finds it, it is like Mr. Garrod's, it will be a very bare and thin residuum, quite as capable of sending "a chill to the heart" as the cold, gray conception of "duty" can be. The chapter closes with

some uninspiring words of disbelief in immortality: "The skies are deaf: and if we would question them concerning immortality, we must go and fetch our answer in person." If this, or aught like this, were the last word of "the religion of all good men," then might we pray God send us another Socrates and another Plato. Mr. Garrod has yet to learn how truly "the religion of all good men" forms the transcendental root of all those ethical relations he seeks to justify, or at least is willing to maintain. He has given us his best, and forgiveness must be ours for thinking that not great is our positive gain.

Of the chapter on "Hymns," one can say no better than that it is poor and unillumined, from almost every point of view, for in those criticisms with which one does heartily agree, there is not a trace of anything original or new. We, therefore, pass to the closing chapter on "Some Practical Aspects of the Problem of Free Will." This problem our author regards as simply moral and practical, and neither metaphysical nor psychological. Judged by the practical standpoint, we cannot take Mr. Garrod's essay as a very serious contribution to the subject. He argues for determinism in a rough and ready sort of way, moral wrecks being his favorite subjects for illustration. But what a merciless criticism of his own theories and treatment are his two closing paragraphs! "There remains, of course, the tremendous fact that the individuals sacrificed on the altars of necessity are many and pitiable." And Mr. Garrod confesses he understands nothing of what this "tremendous" fact signifies, which is in reality an acknowledgment of dismal failure. The truth is, that in any true philosophy of free will there are facts and considerations, on the Libertarian side, that never sweep into Mr. Garrod's view and ken: he is perfectly innocent—though a man of "good sense" and "knowledge of the world"—of the unexpected moves of the human will, both upward and downward, in actual experience. "The Archbishop of Canterbury not merely will not, but cannot, stand on his head in Piccadilly and shout, 'Down with the Church.'" Mr. Garrod is wrong: this very thing has happened, though he may be ignorant of it, and determinism acknowledge it not: not, it is true, in the case—the merely accidental case—of the actual Archbishop, but of one whose academic and ecclesiastical position made it at one time quite as "unpredictable" that he should die a member of the Parliamentary party that cries, "Down with the Church." If Mr. Garrod had been a

man of less "good sense" and knowledge, I should have quoted to him a passage from Emerson on "Experience," since he is fond of swearing by Emerson. The passage is—for we are at times rather fond of swearing by Emerson ourselves—one which has, in sentences, more insight and truth than Mr. Garrod's whole pages: "But it is impossible that the creative power should exclude itself. Into every intelligence there is a door which is never closed, through which the Creator passes. The intellect, seeker of absolute truth, or the heart, lover of absolute good, intervenes for our succor, and at one whisper of these high powers, we awake from ineffectual struggles with this nightmare. We hurl it into its own hell, and cannot again contract ourselves to so base a state."

JAMES LINDSAY.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND.

GLÜCK UND SITTLICHKEIT: Untersuchungen über Gefallen und Lust, naturhaftes und sittliches Vorziehen. Von Hermann Schwarz. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1902. Pp. 210.

The author of this very original and skillful work achieved great distinction some years ago through his able contributions to the psychology of cognition. The present work adds to the author's reputation as a patient and careful observer and expounder of the facts of consciousness. If the work suffers by comparison with the earlier works above mentioned, this is, in great part, due to the fact that the psychology of volition and moral judgment is relatively obscure and neglected. At the same time, the author seems in this book to be too keenly conscious of being a pioneer, and to be thus beguiled into declamation and jerky emphasis, where reasoned exposition would be more appropriate and helpful. It should be noticed that this book is supplementary to two previous works, entitled "Die Psychologie des Willens" and "Das Sittliche Leben." Yet, allowing for this, the author yields too often to the temptation to refer to his previous works, and does not take sufficient pains to make this work complete in itself. Occasionally, as, for example, on p. 103, and again in p. 118, note 2, he crowds into footnotes some novel and for his purpose important doctrine, referring the reader for its fuller exposition to some previous book or article of his own. He is, moreover, too negligent of